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C

ertainly, one should always take a positive stance with respect to any
practical and workable proposal aimed at increasing the protections
afforded the civilian population in time of anned conflict. Despite that premise,
which is basic to any consideration of the law of anned conflict, or perhaps
because of the restrictive adjectives "practical and workable" which have been,
and must be, used, it appears necessary to cast a negative vote with respect to a
well-intentioned, but impractical, proposal first made by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations in 1969 and gready elaborated upon by him in 1970.
On December 19, 1968, by Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the General Assembly
of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to study and prepare a
report on the subject of "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict." He
did so, his staff producing AI7720, November 20, 1969 (hereinafter referred to
as the "1969 Report"). On December 16, 1969, by Resolution 2597 (XXIV),
the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his study and
to submit a further report on the same subject. Once again he did so, his staff
producing A/8052, September 18, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "1970
Report").
In the 1969 Report eight paragraphs (145-52) were devoted to the subject
of "civilian refuges or sanctuaries." In March, 1970, during the course of a Panel
which included the United Nations official actually responsible for the
preparation of that Report-the Director of Human Rights Division of the
United Nations Secretariat, the present writer, in passing, ~uestioned the
practicality of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries. This adverse
comment, which really did not rise to the category of criticism, may well have
inadvertendy contributed to the fact that the 1970 Report expanded the
coverage on the subject from eight to forty-three paragraphs (45-87). It is the
purpose of this paper to demonstrate the impracticality of the proposal for such
civilian sanctuaries and the actual lack of need for such a device if there is
compliance with already well-established nonns of the law of anned conflict,
perhaps amplified in the light of currendy available and foreseeable methods of
conducting such conflict.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Some discussion in depth of the proposal contained in the two Reports is
essential for an understanding of the problem. The basic proposal was originally
advanced in the following language:
The difficulties which are attendant on arriving at a practically useful definition
of what constitutes a legitimate military objective have led to the consideration
of other solutions which might effectively increase the protection afforded to
civilians in anned conflicts. One method might be to gather and place under
shelter as large a part of the civilian population as possible, especially women,
children, the elderly, the sick and those who do not participate in the armed
conflict, nor contribute in any way to the pursuit of military operations. This
might be achieved by adopting and developing, on a larger scale than provided at
present, a system of safety zones which would offer special protection and even
.
. from attack .2
munumty
The purpose of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries was
subsequendy more clearly drawn when the 1970 Report stated:
The civilian sanctuaries would therefore be established to draw the attention
of the belligerents to the presence in a given area ofpersons whom they are already
obligated to respect, protect or refrain from injuring. In effect, refuges or
sanctuaries might assist in facilitating the observance by the belligerents of the
obligations incumbent upon them. 3
Both of the Reports recognized the need for numerous safeguards in order
to ensure the successful operation of the civilian sanctuaries and to prevent their
misuse. These safeguards were gathered together into the following four
propositions:
1. The necessity for the designation and recognition of civilian sanctuaries in
peacetime before hostilities have aroused animosity and suspicion;4

2. Restrictions on the selection and use of such sanctuaries;5
3. Special identification markings for the sanctuaries and the personnel serving
6

in them; and

4. A system of control and verification. 7
It appears to the present writer that the mere enumeration of these few
requirements, which is far from exhaustive, demonstrates the lack of feasibility
of the proposal.
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The idea of civilian sanctuaries did not emerge full-blown from the
8
Secretary-General's brow. It is not even the application of existing ideas and
norms to a totally new concept. It is merely the elaboration and extension of an
existing system ofprotection, which was designed for comparatively small groups
ofindividuals and for comparatively small areas of real estate, to potentially very
large segments of the population and potentially enormous portions of the land
mass of a belligerent nation. As the 1969 ,Report points out,9 the doctrine of
the "open city," which has been elsewhere defined as "an undefended city, open
to occupation by enemy forces· without harm to the inhabitants,,,lO originated
in the customary law of war and was codified in the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907 Y Thus, the entry of the Germans into Paris in June, 1940, during
World War II, has been termed "a classical example of the application of the
[1907] Hague Rules of Land Warfare.,,12 During that same War, the "open
city" doctrine failed to provide protection to the civilian populations in the cases
of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana in 1941 and in the case of Rome in 1943. 13
Three very small neutralized zones were apparendy established in Jerusalem in
1948, but these probably did not result from an application of the "open city"
. 14
doctnne.
Elaborating on earlier Geneva Conventions, each of the four 1949
Conventions provides for protected areas of one character or another: hospital
zones; 15·
pnsoner 0 f war camps; 16 neutrali ze d zones; 17 an d·mternment camps. 18
19
The 1954 Hague Convention contains provisions setting up an elaborate
system for the protection of areas containing cultural monuments. And, finally,
the so-called Drqft Rules disseminated by the International Committee of the
20
Red Cross in 1956 have a number of provisions on the subject of sanctuaries.
In summary, various types of protected zones for different categories of
noncombatants, emerging from the "open city" doctrine, have existed for a
considerable period of time. All of these protected zones have been restricted
to comparatively small land areas, perhaps a few thousand square yards or meters,
at most a few square miles or kilometers, intended to afford protection to a city
and its civilian population, to a hospital, its patients, and staff, to a prisoner of
war or internment camp and its inmates, to a museum and its attendants. The
Secretary-General's proposal would gready enlarge this concept. It proposes
protected zones on a grand scale: not thousands of square yards or meters, but
thousands and hundreds of thousands of square miles or kilometers; not the
noncombatant personnel of a hospital, or of an internment camp, or of a
museum, or even of a city, but a very large part of the population of the nations
engaged in hostilities?1 Laudable and idealistic as the proposal obviously is, it
unfortunately appears to be completely impractical in the world in which we
live.
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The problems involved in obtaining acceptance of and in implementing the
proposal appear to this writer to be insurmountable. Can anyone believe that
today's nations and their governments could reach agreement, even in
peacetime, either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis, exempting large
portions of their respective territories from all types of attack in the event of
war?22 Can anyone believe that such nations would remove from, and prohibit
the subsequent introduction into, the zones so designated of every ~e of
industry and activity which could in any way contribute to a war effort? Can
anyone believe that in this age of nuclear weapons and "quick" wars, a nation
would, at the outset of hostilities, be in a position to devote the necessary energy,
manpower, and equipment to the task of moving millions of its civilians into
the neutralized zones?24 Can anyone believe that nations at war would be in a
position to devote the necessary energy, manpower, and equipment to the task
of providing logistic support for millions of its citizens who would necessarily
be nonproductive insofar as the war effort is concerned?25 Can anyone believe
that, human nature being what it is, the worker who stays on his job in sUfPort
of the war effort can be successfully separated from his wife and children?2 Can
anyone believe that any nation at war will voluntarily and actually deprive itself
of an urgently needed resource by moving into a neutralized zone a great mass
of potential labor, even though it be women, children, and the elderly?27 Can
anyone believe that today's nations will accept "a system of control and
verification" in the persons of foreign observers stationed within their territory
in time of war?28 Can anyone believe that the huge areas involved, the
impossibility of really effective control and verification, and the pressures of
wartime requirements, would not result in massive evasions of the restrictions
and improper usage of the neutralized zones?29 Can anyone believe that the
nations of today would accept any such proposal without an escape clause such
as the "imperative military necessity" clause of the 1949 Geneva Conventions?30
Can anyone believe that a nuclear nation, envisioning the eventuality of defeat,
would not use the neutralized zones as a basis for blackmail? These are but a few
of the many questions raised by the Secretary-General's proposal, to each and
every one of which this writer would give a negative answer.
Is there an alternative to the Secretary-General's proposal for large-scale
civilian sanctuaries for the protection of the civilian population? There most
certainly is, and it is not only more feasible, but it is much more likely to be
acceptable to the community of nations. That alternative is as follows:

First, full-scale application of and compliance with the already existing
restrictions on allowable military objectives, modernized as necessary to meet
present-day requirements. What is needed is not new norms, but compliance
with existing norms. For example, target-area bombing certainly violated the
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principle of the military objective, but it was used by both sides so generally
during World War II that the principle practically ceased to exist. It must be
revived. Again, and perhaps somewhat peripherally, the Protecting Power is
already available to do all that the Secretary-General would have a
Commissioner-General or Observer-General do during time of actual
hostilities-but in not one of the scores of hostilities which have occurred since
the end of World War II has this extremely valuable international institution
been called into action.

Second, the law of air warfare, if any now exists, should be elaborated upon
31
and codified The extreme reluctance of nations to establish recognized and
accepted international rules in this very vital area is really incredible. For
example, all governments express horror at the mere suggestion that any other
nation, then engaged in hostilities, has resorted to "terror bombing"-the
bombing of nonmilitary objectives and of the civilian population in order to
destroy enemy morale and to bring an adversary to its knees on the home front
when it has not been possible to do so on the batdefront. The 1923 Hague Rules
32
of Air Warfare and the ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules specifically proposed such
a prohibition,33 but many years later that proposal is still in limbo. Here, too,
World War II practices have, unfortunately, probably negated the principle of
the military objective.
TI/ird, the initiation of some system of effective sanctions against belligerents
who violate the principle of the military objective. Such a system of sanctions
has been drafted and accepted with respect to individual violators of the 1949
Geneva Conventions?4 There is no reason why some such system cannot be
devised for nation violators as well as individual violators of the principle of the
military objective, once that principle has been resurrected.
In summary, it is suggested that the existing law of armed conflict, elaborated
as may be necessary, particularly in the area of air warfare, if complied with (and
with additional methods to be established for enforcing compliance), can provide
the civilian population with the protection which it requires and to which it is
already entided under existing norms; and that it can do this much more readily
than can the elaborate and impractical proposal advanced by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1969 and 1970 Reports on
"Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict. ,,35
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